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Abstract. Conventional econometric tests of optimizing models typically involve embed-
ding the optimizing model in a parametric specification and then examining the para-
metric restrictions imposed by the optimization hypothesis. The optimization hypothesis
is rejected if the estimated parameters are significantly different, in the statistical sense,
from the values implied by optimization. I argue that a more fruitful approach to testing
optimizing behavior is to measure the departure from optimization using the estimated
objective function, and see whether this departure is significant in an economic sense. I
discuss procedures for doing this that can be used in several sorts of optimizing models,
and give a detailed illustration in the case of aggregate demand estimation.
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Goodness-of-Fit in Optimizing Models
Hal R. Varian
Much of economics rests on the principle of optimizing behavior. Firms are assumed to
minimize costs and maximize profits; consumers are assumed to maximize utility, and
so on. In the last several years, standard techniques have been developed to test these
models of optimizing behavior. Suppose, for example, that we are attempting to test the
hypothesis that a time series of observations on factor choices by a firm can be viewed
as cost-minimizing behavior. A common approach would be to pick a parametric form
for the underlying cost or production function, derive the associated set of factor demand
functions, and then see if the estimated parameters satisfy the restrictions imposed by the
model of cost minimization.
Similarly, if one wanted to test a set of data on consumer choices for consistency
with utility maximization behavior, one would first specify a function form for the utility
function, derive the associated set of utility-maximizing demand functions, estimate the
parameters of these demand functions using the consumer choice data, and then see if these
estimated parameters satisfy the restrictions imposed by the model of utility maximization.
In my view, these procedures are not very good ways to test models of optimizing
behavior for two distinct reasons. First, there is often no need to embed the optimizing
model in a parametric framework. I argue below that it is perfectly possible to test
reasonably complex models of optimization behavior without having to use parametric
specifications. Second, testing parametric restrictions by using classical significance tests
involve an overly restrictive sense of "significance." What matters for most purposes in
economics is not whether a consumer's violation of the optimizing model is statistically
significant, but whether it is economically significant. And the economic significance of
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a departure from optimizing behavior has nothing to do with whether or not estimated
parameters pass or fail a test of statistical significance.
Hence the conventional methods are lacking in two senses: first, they have an excess
reliance on parametric forms, and second, they test for statistically significant violations of
optimization rather than economically significant violations. Let us examine each of these
points in more detail.
1. Nonparametric Tests of Optimizing Behavior
Suppose that we observe a set of price vectors, pt, and net output vectors, y', for t =
1, ... , T and want to test the hypothesis of period-by-period profit maximization. Then
a necessary condition for these data to be consistent with profit maximization is that the
following inequalities are satisfied:
ptyt ;> pty'
for all pairs of observations s and t. These inequalities simply say that the profit from the
observed choices must be at least as large as the profits from any other feasible choice.
Varian (1984) refers to this as the Weak Axiom of Profit Maximization (WAPM). Simi-
lar inequalities have been examined by several other authors including Afriat (1972) and
Samuelson (1947).
It can also be shown that WAPM is a suificient condition for profit maximization in
the sense that any set of data that satisfies WAPM can be used to construct a "nice"
production set that could have generated the observed behavior as optimizing behavior.
See Varian (1984) for details.
Hence a sensible test of optimizing behavior in this context is simply to see if the
observed prices and net output vectors satisfy the inequalities implied by WAPM. If the
data violate the inequalities then we can reject the model of optimizing behavior.
Suppose that we observe a set of data (w1, x*, yt) for t = 1,... ,T, were wt is a vector
of factor prices, x' is a vector of factor demands, and y' is a (scalar) measure of output.
We might be interested in testing the hypothesis that the firm that generated this data
was minimizing the cost of producing the observed output.
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If the firm is minimizing costs, it must satisfy the following set of inequalities
wtx' <wtz* for all y' yt
These inequalities require that the cost of the observed production plan must be no greater
than the cost of any other production plan that produces at least as much output. Varian
(1984) calls this the Weak Axiom of Cost Minimization (WACM).'
Again, this condition is necessary and sufficient for cost-minimizing behavior in the
sense that if some data satisfy WACM then it is possible to construct a production set
that would generate the observed choices as cost minimizing choices. It is very easy to
apply this test to observed choices to see if they violate the inequalities; no appeal to
parametric methods is required.
Finally, suppose that we observe some price vectors pt and quantity vectors a9, for
t = 1,... , T and want to test the hypothesis that these data were generated by a utility
maximizing consumer. Define the revealed preference relation R by xtRx' if and only if
there is some sequence of observations x'... xu such that pxt ptxr, p...,pxU > pu'x8.
Then a set of data is consistent with the model of utility maximization if and only if it
satisfies the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP),
xt Rx* implies p'x' <p~xt .
Again, this condition is easily tested; see Varian (1982a) for details.
Given that each of these classical models of optimizing behavior is easily tested by
simply checking a set of inequalities, why do the conventional procedures use complicated
statistical measures? Certainly the inequalities described above have been in the literature
a long time. See Samuelson (1938), Afriat (1967), Diewert and Parkan (1985) and others.2
1 See Varian (1984) for a discussion of the literature on this sort of test, which includes contributions
from Samuelson (1947), Hanoch and Rothschild (1972) and Afriat (1972).
2For more recent work in nonparametric analysis of consumption behavior see Browning (1984), Bronars
(1987), Deaton (1985) Green and Srivastava (1985), (1986), Houtman and Maks (1987), L andsburg (1981),
Manser and McDonald (1988), and Varian (1982a), (1982b), (1984), (1985), (1988).
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One explanation is that economists are simply not used to thinking about the im-
plications of optimizing models for a finite set of observations. It is more natural for
economists, perhaps, to think of the outcome of optimization to be an entire demand or
supply function.
Another, perhaps more important explanation, is that the nonparametric tests de-
scribed above axe "sharp" tests: either the data pass the test exactly, or they don't. If the
data don't satisfy the tests, the optimizing model is rejected: the tests do not allow for an
"error term."
There have been some attempts to deal with this problem of the overly sharp nature
of nonparametric tests. Banker and Maindiratta (1988) suggest finding the largest set of
observations consistent with optimization. Varian (1985) suggests finding the set of data
that is nearest to the observed data in some appropriate norm.
Conventional statistical test do allow for an error term. To test the hypothesis that
some relationship holds among some estimated parameters, we ask whether the value
of some test statistic is likely or unlikely according to the sampling distribution of the
parameters. Roughly speaking, the optimization model is rejected if the observed value of
the test statistic is unlikely.
The problem with this procedure, in my view, is that it has little to do with the economic
significance of the violation. For example, optimization of some particular parametric form
may imply that two paratneters should sum to one. If we test this hypothesis and reject
it, we must reject the optimizing model. But what are we rejecting? Exact optimization
implies that the two parameters must sum to ezactly one. But ezact optimization isn't
a very interesting hypothesis. It is very unlikely that firms exactly maximize profits or
minimize costs; it is even more unlikely that consumers exactly maximize utility. It is
especially unlikely that consumers maximize some arbitrary parametric approximation to
utility.
What we usually care about is whether optimization is a reasonable way to describe
some behavior. For most purposes, "nearly optimizing behavior" is just as good as "opti-
mizing" behavior.3
3 See Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Cochrane (1989) for interesting discussions of nearly optimizing
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The conventional parametric tests miss this distinction: given enough data, we can
always reject non-optimizing behavior, even if it is "nearly optimizing behavior." The
value of the test statistic will typically give no clue as to whether the economic agent
under examination is nearly optimizing or grossly non-optimizing.4
2. Goodness of Fit Measures
An alternative approach to testing optimizing behavior is to ask how large the violations
of relevant inequalities are in terms of a reasonable economic norm. For example, suppose
that we observe some violations of the Strong Axiom of Profit Maximization. That is, we
observe a pair of observations s and t for which
tt t
py <py8 .
This inequality says that the firm could make more profit by choosing y' when in fact it
chose yt. In this case, a reasonable measure of the magnitude of the violation of profit
maximizing behavior is
rt8, pt(ye - y) _p t y'
py ptyt
This is simply the percent exira profit that the firm could have made at the prices pt if it
had chosen the production vector y8, rather than the production vector y*.
The numbers rt* should be interpreted as "residuals" appropriate for examining the op-
timization model. The best way to present these residuals might be to list the observations
and indicate next to each one the magnitude of the foregone profit. Or, one might want to
look at the average value of the foregone profit, or the largest value of the foregone profit.
Any of these numbers would be a reasonable way to measure how "close" the observed
behavior comes to profit maximizing behavior.
behavior.
4~ A similar point is made by McCloskey (1985), (1989) in a somewhat different context. McCloskey
points out that significance testing, as commonly used in economics, dose not provide an appropriate
measure of the "importance" of a variable in a regression. But McCloskey's critique applies more broadly;
most statistical tests measure violations of a hypothesis in terms of the sampling distribution of the test
statistic, and this is rarely a useful measure of the importance of the violation.
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The case of cost minimization is almost the same. If we have a violation of WACM, we
have two observations t and s such that
wtx' > wtx'afor some y' > yt.
In this case
w t (x t - x*) 1 wtx*
wtxt wtxt
is a reasonable measure of the departure from cost minimization. This number simply
measures how much the firm could have saved if it had chosen x8 rather than xt when it
faced factor prices wt. Again, one might choose the average value or the maximum value
of this index as a measure of the degree of violation of maximization.
If these numbers are small then it seems reasonable to think of the firm under consid-
eration as being "more-or-less" an optimizing firm.5 True, it isn't exactly optimizing, but
exactly optimizing behavior isn't a very plausible hypothesis to begin with.
In addition, the distribution of these measures of profit maximization or cost mini-
mization may be of considerable interest themselves. Suppose, for example, that we are
examining the case of profit maximization using data on a single firm, and we find that
most violations of WAPM indicate that the firm would be better off at time t making
a choice that was made at some later date. This suggests that technological progress or
learning-by-doing may be involved: the more profitable choices weren't made at time t
because they weren't feasible.
Or suppose that we are examining cross-sectional data and we find that most of the
violations of WAPM involve a single firm. This might be taken as evidence that this firm
really doesn't have access to the same technology as the others. The pattern of violations
can tell us a lot about what is going on in the data.
5 How small is small? In general this depends on the problem at hand. The "rnagic rnunber" of
significance tests, 5%, is probably a reasonable choice.
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3. Consumer Choice
The description of a reasonable measure of goodness-of-fit in the case of consumer choice
is somewhat more involved. We follow the suggestion of Afriat (1967).
Afriat's measure is calculated in the following manner. For a given set of numbers
(et), t = 1,... , T, with 0 < et < 1, define an extension of the standard direct revealed
preference relation by
xt R° x' if and only if etptxt ptx'.
If et = 1 this is the standard direct revealed preference relation; if et = 0 the relation is
vacuous in the sense that observation t cannot be revealed preferred to any other obser-
vation. As et varies from 1 to 0 the number of observations revealed preferred to other
observations monotonically decreases.
We refer to et as the Afriat efficiency index for observation t. It can be thought of as
how much less the potential expenditure on a bundle x' has to be before we will consider
it worse than the observed choice x t . If e* is .90, for example, we will only count bundles
whose cost is less than 90% of an observed choice as being revealed worse than that choice.
Said another way: if et is .90 and x' would cost only 5% less than xt, we would not consider
this a significant enough difference to conclude that xt was preferred by the consumer to
x 8 . We are allowing the consumer a "margin of error" of (1 - et).
Given an arbitrary set of data (pt, x t ), let us choose a set of efficiency indices (et) that
are as close as possible to 1 in some norm. If the data satisfy the revealed preference
conditions exactly, then we can choose et = 1 for all t = 1,... ,T. If we choose et = 0 for
all t = 1,... , T, then the data vacuously satisfy the revealed preference conditions, since
no observation is revealed preferred to any other. Thus for any reasonable norm, there will
be some set of (et) that are as close as possible to 1 that will summarize "how close" the
observed choices are to maximizing choices.
In Afriat's (1967) original treatment of this idea, he considered choosing a single e that
applied to all observations, rather than a different et for each observation. The advantage
of Afriat's original proposal is that it is much easier to compute a single index e than the
multiple indices (et ).
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Houtman and Maks (1987) suggest the following binary search. Start with e = 1 and
test for violations of revealed preference using Warshall's algorithm as described in Varian
(1982a). If the data fail to satisfy the strong axiom, try e = 1/2. If e = 1/2 doesn't work,
try e = 1/4. If e = 1/2 does work, try e = 3/4, and so on. After n revealed preference
tests, you are within 1/2" of the actual efficiency index.
Computing the set of efficiency indices that are as close as possible to 1 in some norm
is substantially more difficult. If we choose a quadratic norm, for example, we would have




subject to the constraint that the revealed preference relation Re satisfies the Generalized
Axiom of Revealed Preference. This approach is significantly more demanding from a
computational perspective.
4. A Characterization of the Efficiency Indices
There is a characterization of the set of (et) that minimize some norm that will be useful
in what follows. In order to describe it, we need some formal definitions.
As above, define the relation Re by x* Re x iff etptxt > ptx, and let Re be the transitive
closure of this relation. Then define GARPe to mean
X* Re x* implies etpixt <pt*x*.
If et = 1 for all t then this reduces to the standard definition of GARP.
Here is another way to state this definition: if some data (pt, xt, et) satisfy GARPe,
then
for all x* Re x* we have etptxt px*.
This statement can be written as
ptx*
et  .- for all x* Re x*.
If we attempt to choose a set of (et) that are on the average as close as possible to 1, then
this inequality will typically be binding for some observation s so we have:
et= mi --- (2)
z*Re z* pix'
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Note that this is not really an "operational" way to determine et, since et is implicitly
involved in the relation Re. Nevertheless, the characterization is still useful, as we shall
see shortly.
5. Parametric Methods in Production Analysis
We have seen how to compute measures of goodness-of-fit for nonparametric methods to
test models of profit maximization, cost minimization, and utility maximization. However,
the same methods can be used in a parametric context.
Consider first the case of profit maximization. Let p* be the price of output and
wt the vector of factor prices in observation t. Let .yt be the (scalar) output and xt
the vector of factor inputs in observation t. Suppose that we estimate some parametric
production function y = f(x,#i9) where 0 is a vector of parameters. Given an estimate of
the parameters, 8, we can calculate the maximal profits at each observation t, 7r(pt, wt , /).
We can then compare the maximal profits from the estimated technology to the actual
profits:
ir(pt,fl) - (piyt - wtxt).
The magnitude of this number measures the degree to which the observed choice behavior
at observation t fails to maximize the estimated production function. Hence, it is a measure
of how closely the observed production function comes to approximating profit-maximizing
behavior.
If we are interested in cost minimizing behavior, we would simply estimate the cost
function implied by some parametric production function, c(wt, yt, /3). The deviation from
cost minimization is given by
wtx* - c(w', y, b)
This is the difference between the actual costs incurred and the minimal costs, conditional
on the assumption that the true technology is of the particular parametric form described
by f(x,f?).
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6. Parametric Methods for Consumption Analysis
Suppose that one is willing to postulate that some observed demand behavior was generated
by the maximization of a particular parametric utility function u(x, /.), where /3 is a vector
of parameters.
Given a parametric utility function u(x, P), we can define the associated money metric
utility function, m(p, x, fi) by
m(p,x,/) =min py
s.t. u(y,l) ;> u(x,/3).
In words, the money metric utility function measures the minimum expenditure at prices
p the consumer would need to be as well off as he would be consuming the bundle x. For
more on the money metric utility function see Samuelson (1974), King (1982), and Varian
(1984).
In terms of the money metric utility function an index of the degree of violation of
utility maximizing behavior could be given by
., m(pt, x t, #)
ptxt




Note the similarity with equation 2; the only difference is that et uses the partial order
over consumption bundles given by the revealed preference relation, while it uses the total
order over consumption bundles given by the utility function.
This sort of money metric index is a very natural measure of how close the observed
consumer choices come to maximizing a particular utility function u(x,#/6). I suggest that it
is a useful statistic to report as a goodness-of-fit measure in models of demand estimation.
As with most measures of goodness-of-fit, we can also use the money metric measure
as a criterion to estimate the parameters in question. A natural estimate is to find that
value of /# that minimizes the degree of violation of maximizing behavior as measured by
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the values of the indices i. For example, one could try to minimize the sum of squares,
T(jt) 2 . I believe that this sort of estimator has several desirable properties.
First, it uses a sensible economic norm for goodness-of-fit. Conventional estimators of
demand parameters use the sum-of-squared errors of the observed and predicted quantities
demand, or some variant on this. But this has little economic content; a large difference
between predicted and observed demand can easily be consistent with a small difference
in utility. This is depicted in Figure 1. Here the observed choice is far from the predicted
choice in Euclidean distance, but quite close in terms of money metric utility. The model
is a bad fit in terms of Euclidean distance, but a good fit in the sense that the consumer










Figure 1. This is a good fit in terms of money metric utility although it is a bad fit in
terms of the usual error terms.
Second, the minimized value of the objective function gives a meaningful economic
measure of how close the observed choices are to maximizing choice for the particular
parametric form involved. If the average value of et is .95, then it is meaningful to say
that the observed choice behavior was 95 percent as efficient as maximizing behavior.
Third, the mechanics of the estimation problem may be much simpler than they are
using the conventional approach. Economic theory imposes the restriction that a money
metric utility function must be an increasing, linearly homogeneous, and concave function
of prices. These constraints are not terribly difficult to impose on the maximization prob-
lem. By contrast theory implies that a system of demand equations must have a symmetric
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negative semidefinite Slutsky substitution matrix. Imposing this restriction involves im-
posing nonlinear cross-equation restrictions on a system of equations. In general this is a
difficult thing to do.
Fourth, this same method can easily be applied to estimation of production relation-
ships. If one starts with a null hypothesis of cost minimization, say, then it makes sense to
measure the goodness-of-fit of estimation procedure by comparing the actual costs to the
minimum costs implied by the estimated parameters. If it is thought that errors in opti-
mization are a significant component of the error term, then it can make sense to estimate
the parameters by choosing parameter estimates that minimize the difference between the
observed costs and the minimum costs.
7. An Example
In order to examine the money metric goodness-of-fit measure described in the last sec-
tion, I tried an experiment using U.S. aggregate consumption data. The data were taken
from the Citibank economic database and consisted of aggregate consumption of durables,
nondurables, and services from 1947 to 1987. The data are presented in Table 3.
Like most aggregate consumption data, these figures satisfy the Generalized Axiom of
Revealed Preference. This is due to the fact that during the post-war period, most devel-
oped economies have experienced reasonably steady real growth: each year has generally
been revealed preferred to the previous year and the data trivially satisfy the revealed pref-
erence restrictions. Hence the aggregate demand data are consistent with the maximization
of utility of a representative consumer.
However, it may be of interest to ask how well common parametric forms of utility
functions do in describing these data. It is typically the case that one can reject the
restrictions imposed by maximization using parametric forms such as the translog utility
function; see, for example, Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1975). But how large are
these violations in terms of the econromic norm described in the last section? In order to
answer this question, I estimated the parameters of a Cobb-Douglas utility function and
measured the goodness-of-fit using the money metric measure.
The Cobb-Douglas utility function is a convenient parametric form since it has a mini-
mal number of parameters and it automatically satisfy the maximization restrictions. This
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means that our estimated goodness-of-fit measure will generally be an upper bound on the
goodness-of-fit using a more flexible function form. For example, the Cobb-Douglas utility
function is a special case of the translog utility function. Thus the "best fitting" Cobb-
Douglas function will have at least as good a fit, in terms of our money-metric measure,
as the best fitting translog function.
I estimated the parameters of a Cobb-Douglas utility system using three different tech-
niques. The first technique was simply to take the average expenditure share of each good.
The second technique was to estimate the regression xi = aie/pi, where e is the total
expenditure on the three goods. I used Zellner's seemingly unrelated regression technique
and imposed the normalization that a1 + 2 + aa3 = 1. (Estimating the three equations
separately gave almost the same estimates.) The third technique was to determine the
values of the parameters that maximized the goodness-of-fit, as measured by difference
between the money metric utility and the actual expenditure. The first two methods are
straightforward, but a description of the third method may be in order.
Let us derive the money metric utility function associated with the Cobb-Douglas utility
function u(x1 , x2,x3) = 114 x2 a s. For algebraic convenience we impose the normalization
that the exponents sum to 1. The money metric utility function is defined to be the amount
of money that it takes as some prices (p1,p2, p3) to choose an optimal bundle that has the
same utility as the bundle (x 1 , x 2 , x 3).
If we let m be the necessary amount of money, we have the equation
aim "aIm a2m aam "z alz az2xas (f) =p2p P1P2 P3)
Solving for m we have
m(p, -) = ai~41 a 2 2-an(p a,(p2 x 2 )2(pa 2 )a4 (3)
(For a different derivation, see Varian (1984), page 129.) Taking logs, we can write this
equation as
lanm(p, x) = -alalai- a2n a2 - as naa + aln px+ a2 np2 x 2 + asnpaza. (4)
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We suppose that the log of the actual expenditure in period t, in et , is equal to the log
of the expenditure minimizing amount, lnrn(pt , xt ), plus an error term representing the
optimization error. Using equation (4), we have
mnet = -a1Inai -a2Ina 2 - a3lIna3 + al1np*1xt +a 2 Iptai + aa lnptx + et.
I estimated this equation using the nonlinear least squares routine in MicroTSP, imposing




Method al a2  a3
Expenditure shares 0.152 0.461 0.387
Regression 0.129 0.358 0.413
Nonlinear Least Squares 0.150 0.472 0.378
The first thing to observe is that the three methods give somewhat different answers.
This is simply a consequence of the fact that the estimates which "fit the data best" depend
on what measure of goodness-of-fit you use. The regression estimates that minimizes the
sum of squared deviations from the observed demands will not in general be the same
as the estimates that minimize the squared difference between money metric utility and
actual expenditure.
It is surprising that the expenditure share method and the money metric method give
very similar estimates, especially since the expenditure share estimate involves a system
of equations while the money metric estimation involves only a single equation. Of course,
ultimately it is a single sum-of-squares that is minimized in the regression technique, so
perhaps this is not so surprising after all.
The computed values of the money metric utility function for each of the different
parameters are given in Table 2, along with the percentage difference between money metric
utility and the actual expenditure for each of the three different estimation methods.
Note that these percent differences are very small, at least for the expenditure share
estimates and the NLS estimates. Using the expenditure share methods the largest differ-
ence is 7.4%, and the majority of the differences are less than one percent. The average
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difference is 2%. This suggests that the observed aggregate demand behavior is not very
different from optimizing behavior, at least when measured in units of "wasted expendi-
ture." 6
Similar results hold for the nonlinear least squares estimates. Here the average value of
the error is only 1.9%. The regression estimates do much poorer, resulting in an average
error of about 5%.
It is worth noting that the residuals in all of the estimates are positive in each observa-
tion; this is as it should be if the optimizing model is to make any sense since the minimum.
expenditure to achieve a given level of utility must always be less than an arbitrary ex-
penditure.
A closer examination of the index shows the limitations of the Cobb-Douglas functional
form. The Cobb-Douglas form requires that expenditure shares remain constant, while
the data clearly show that the share of services in expenditure has significantly increased.
Obviously, a more flexible functional form would be appropriate for these data.
To the extent that a more flexible functional form would fit the data better than the
Cobb-Douglas form, our goodness-of-fit measure should be regarded as an upper bound
on "wasted expenditure." If the average "wasted expenditure" in the Cobb-Douglas case
is less than 2%, it would be even less if we used a more flexible functional form.
6 Cochrane (1989) independently adopted a similar approach to excamining tests of intertemporal con-
sumption models. He finds that the deviation of actual consumption from the optimal intertemporal
allocation of consumption is on the order of 30 cents per month-a remarkably small number. Cochrane
also discusses the distinction between statistical significance and econornic significance in much the same
terms as I do.
15
References
Afriat, S. (1967) "The Construction of a Utility Function from Expenditure Data," Inter-
national Economic Review, 8, 67-77.
Afriat, S. (1972) "Efficiency Estimates of Production Functions," International Economic
Review, 8, 568-598.
Akerlof, G. and J. Yellen (1985) "Can Small Deviations from Rationality Make Significant
Differences to Economic Equilibria?"," American Economic Review, 75, 708-720.
Banker, R. and A. Maindiratta (1988) "Nonparametric Analysis of Technical and Alloca-
tive Efficiencies in Production," Econometrica, 56, 1315-1332.
Bronars, S. (1987) "The Power of Nonparametric Tests," Econometrica, 55, 3, 693-698.
Browning, M. (1984) "A Non-Parametric Test of the Life-Cycle Rational Expectations
Hypothesis," International Economic Review, 30, 979-992.
Christensen, L., Jorgensen, D. and Lau, L. (1975) "Transcendental Logarithmic Utility
Functions," American Economic Review, 65, 367-383.
Cochrane, J. (1989) "The Sensitivity of Tests of Intertemporal Allocation of Consumption
to Near-Rational Alternatives," American Economic Review, 79, 319-337.
Deaton, A. (1987) "Life-cycle models of consumption: is the evidence consistent with the
theory?," in Advances in Econometrics - Fifth World Congress, volume II, ed. T.
Bewley. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Diewert, E. and C. Parkan (1985) "Tests for Consistency of Consumer Data and Nonpara-
metric Index Numbers," Journal of Econometrics, 30, 127-147.
Green, R. and S. Srivastava (1985) "Risk Aversion and Arbitrage," Journal of Finance,
40,1, 257-268.
Green, R. and S. Srivastava (1986) "Expected Utility Maximization and Dernand Behav-
ior," Jousrnal of Economic Theory, 38, 2, 313-323.
16
Hanoch, G. and Rothschild, M. (1972) "Testing the Assumptions of Production Theory:
a Nonparametric Approach," Journal of Political Economy, 8, 256-272.
Houtman, M. and J. Maks (1987) "The Existence of Homothetic Utility Functions Gener-
ating Dutch Consumer Data," University of Groningen.
King, M (1982) "Welfare Analysis of Tax Reforms Using Household Data," Journal of
Public Economics, 21, 183-214.
Landsburg, S. (1981) "Taste Change in the United Kingdom, 1900-1955," Journal of
Political Economy, 89, 92-104.
Manser, M. and R. McDonald (1988) "An Analysis of Substitution Bias in Measuring
Inflation, 1959-85," Econometrica, 56, 909-930.
McCloskey, D. (1985) "The Loss Function Has Been Mislaid: The Rhetoric of Significance
Tests," American Economic Review, 75, 201-205.
McCloskey, D. (1989) "Formalism in Economics, Rhetorically Speaking," Ricerche Econom-
niche, 43, 57-75.
Samuelson, P. (1938) "A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer Behavior," Economica, 5,
61-71.
Samuelson, P. (1947) Foundations of Economic Analysis. Camridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Samuelson, P. (1974) "Complementarity: an Essay on the 40th Anniversary of the Hicks-Allen
Revolution in Demand Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, 12, 4, 1255-1289.
Varian, H. (1982a) "The Nonparametric Approach to Demand Analysis," Econometrica,
50, 4, 945-972.
Varian, H. (1982b) "Nonparametric Test of Models of Consumer Behavior," Review of
Economic Sttulies, 50, 99-110.
Varian, H. (1984) Microeconomic Analysis. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.
17
Varian, H. (1984) "The Nonparametric Approach to Production Analysis," Econometrica,
52, 8, 579497.
Varian, H. (1985) "Nonparametric Analysis of Optimizing Behavior with Measurement
Error," Journal of Econometrics, 30, 445-458.




1. See Varian (1984) for a discussion of the literature on this sort of test, which includes
contributions from Samuelson (1947), Hanoch and Rothschild (1972) and Afriat (1972).
2. For more recent work in nonparametric analysis of consumption behavior see Browning
(1984), Bronars (1987), Deaton (1985) Green and Srivastava (1985), (1986), Houtman
and Maks (1987), Landsburg (1981), Manser and McDonald (1988), and Varian (1982a),
(1982b), (1984), (1985), (1988).
3. See Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Cochrane (1989) for interesting discussions of nearly
optimizing behavior.
4. A similar point is made by McCloskey (1985), (1989) in a somewhat different context.
McCloskey points out that significance testing, as commonly used in economics, dose not
provide an appropriate measure of the "importance" of a variable in a regression. But
McCloskey's critique applies more broadly; most statistical tests measure violations of a
hypothesis in terms of the sampling distribution of the test statistic, and this is rarely a
useful measure of the importance of the violation.
5. How small is small? In general this depends on the problem at hand. The "magic
number" of significance tests, 5%, is probably a reasonable choice.
6. Cochrane (1989) independently adopted a similar approach to examining tests of in-
tertemporal consumption models. He finds that the deviation of actual consumption from
the optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption is on the order of 30 cents per month-
a remarkably small number. Cochrane also discusses the distinction between statistical
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Durables Nondurables Services Durables Nondurables Services
Year P1 P2 Pa 31 es _s
1947 27.40 26.88 16.85 20.43 90.88 50.60
1948 28.77 29.18 17.77 22.85 96.60 55.48
1949 29.95 27.85 18.45 25.05 94.85 58.42
1950 31.23 27.73 18.90 30.73 98.22 63.15
1951 31.85 29.73 19.40 29.85 -109.15 69.03
1952 31.57 29.85 20.30 29.23 114.72 75.13
1953 31.77 29.38 21.40 32.67 117.83 82.13
1954 32.10 30.02 22.18 32.10 119.67 88.05
1955 33.38 30.60 23.02 38.88 124.70 94.30
1956 34.73 30.95 24.02 38.20 130.78 101.63
1957 36.50 31.90 25.02 39.65 137.10 108.55
1958 36.92 32.85 26.10 37.17 141.75 115.67
1959 38.50 33.17 26.93 42.80 148.47 125.00
1960 38.77 33.63 27.80 43.42 153.20 134.00
1961 38.88 34.08 28.40 41.90 157.40 141.80
1962 39.75 34.58 29.13 47.02 163.82 151.05
1963 40.15 34.90 29.85 51.80 169.35 160.63
1964 40.35 35.25 30.60 56.85 179.68 172.78
1965 40.92 36.10 31.43 63.48 191.85 185.40
1966 41.55 37.35 32.60 68.53 208.45 200.30
1967 42.33 38.23 33.80 70.63 216.90 216.00
1968 44.55 39.98 35.65 81.00 235.00 236.43
1969 46.10 41.98 37.70 86.22 252.18 259.43
1970 47.80 44.05 40.38 85.67 270.32 284.02
1971 50.25 45.92 43.08 97.58 283.27 310.65
1972 51.05 47.90 45.58 111.22 305.10 341.27
1973 50.83 53.75 48.10 124.72 339.55 372.98
1974 54.08 59.58 51.77 123.75 380.90 411.90
1975 61.15 65.13 56.38 135.35 416.20 461.23
1976 65.88 67.60 60.65 161.45 451.95 515.92
1977 69.15 71.03 65.45 184.50 490.45 582.25
1978 72.78 76.00 70.30 205.57 541.80 656.10
1979 78.25 83.55 75.88 218.95 613.25 734.55
1980 85.55 88.85 83.72 219.28 681.35 831.95
1981 93.65 96.78 92.30 239.88 740.58 934.70
1982 100.00 100.00 100.03 252.65 771.00 1026.97
1983 101.60 102.50 106.13 289.10 816.70 1128.75
1984 102.97 106.17 111.60 335.55 867.30 1227.63
1985 102.35 108.50 117.25 368.70 913.13 1347.52
1986 101.38 110.13 122.25 402.43 939.35 1458.05
1987 100.40 114.05 127.42 413.73 982.88 1571.22
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